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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall
1 Both  in  terms  of  its  theme  and  its  wealth  of  erudition,  this  book  by  the  Korean
historian, Hodong Kim, is an invaluable contribution to Central Asian studies, and a
long-awaited worthy successor to the work of the late Joseph Fletcher.  The Muslim
rebellion in Eastern Turkestan and the Emirate established by Ya’qûb Beg from 1864 to
1877 represent a break in the history of modern China. This was a break in territorial,
commercial and political terms. The author makes use of a wide and varied range of
sources, from Chinese administrative archives to Russian military reports, and from
Japanese  studies  to  Turkestani  lithography.  The  latter  are  central  to  Kim’s
documentary evidence because, coming from the very heart of the events, they provide
us with a view of both the facts and their significance, which was very close to that of
the historical protagonists themselves. Here is where this historian’s main concern lies,
to reconstruct the Turkestani point of view at a time when Eastern Turkestan achieved
a unity  and independence that  was recognised by foreign states.  Whether  this  was
indeed historically unprecedented, as the writer states on page xiv, is a delicate matter
to which I will be alluding throughout the present review. In so doing, I will highlight
the politico-religious issues involved.
2 The book is organised into six chapters, and it starts with a description of the social and
political situation in the early 1860s (Chapter 1). Here he shows that, in addition to the
series of rebellions shaking the whole of the north-western region, there were more
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structural reasons behind the weakening of the authority of the Qing empire, such as
the lack of financial resources which increased abusive taxation and led to an extreme
heightening of tensions. This explosive situation put the Chinese Muslims (Tungans) at
the forefront of a violent insurrection, which then rapidly spread, reaching the towns
of Kucha, Urumchi, Yarkand, Kashgar, Khotan, and Ili by the summer of 1864 (Chapter
2).  In  each case it  would appear that  the problem of  leadership was posed.  This  is
particularly interesting insofar as we seem to be dealing with conflicts over legitimacy
and the exercise of power, not simply between Tungans and Turkic peoples, but more
fundamentally between warlords, local nobility, and religious and/or Sufi authorities.
Although  the  latter  wielded  scarcely  any  power,  they  nevertheless  played  an
indispensable role as negotiators at the heart of the rebel factions or ethnic groups, and
this points to a socio-political dimension to Islam in the region which is essential for
understanding its modern history. It was precisely this dimension which led a Kirghiz
rebel to call upon the Naqshbandî Sufi Sheikh, Buzurg Khwâja, and his general Ya’qûb
Beg,  to  leave  their  neighbouring  Ferghana to  support  the  insurrection in  Yarkand.
These were the political and religious realities of the holy war in China (ghazât dar mulk-
i chin). Ya’qûb Beg himself appears as a paradoxical figure in several respects (Chapter
3). Shrouded in historical uncertainties and retrospective legends, this future Emir of
Eastern Turkestan rose  through the military hierarchy of  the Khanate of  Khoqand,
starting with his regency in Âq Masjid and later Khojand before being sent to Kashgar
by the  Khan ‘Âlim Qulî.  Although this  successful  career  was  due  to  his  undeniable
strategic  skills,  plus  certain  advantageous  circumstances  which  gave  him  military
superiority (analysed in detail by Hodong Kim), we should note Ya’qûb Beg’s decisive
move when he sidelined the two rivals Wâli Khân and Buzurg Khwâja, that is to say, the
two holy Sufi authorities. Thanks to this, the general himself became the sole hero and
unique standard bearer of the Islamic insurgency.
3 Chapter 4, devoted to the Muslim state founded by Ya’qûb Beg, is developed at greater
length and is particularly enlightening. It shows that the Emirate was organised in a
pyramidal structure with Ya’qûb Beg himself at the apex. But although he made himself
the single judge and decision-maker in important matters, he was surrounded by court
officials, including the mîrzâbashî (chancellors) who performed essential diplomatic and
administrative functions (running taxation, the treasury,  and the army).  At a lower
level, the territory was divided into several provinces (wilâyat). Each of these was under
the control of a local governor (hâkim) appointed by Ya’qûb and placed in charge of
administering the region’s finances and police. Despite this, the legal system was in the
hands of a traditional Muslim judiciary, the qâdi, mufti, and ra’îs. A second major feature
concerns  the  establishment  of  a  professional  army along strictly  hierarchical  lines.
Here too this work provides abundant details. Finally the point to be remembered is the
general  spirit  of  the  Emirate.  It  proclaimed  itself  an  Islamic  regime,  guaranteeing
religious morality and breaking with the previous Qing order, which was considered to
be infidel. So sharî’a law was strictly applied; some Sufi orders seem to have suffered
persecution while  numerous religious  sites  (mainly  mosques and holy  mausoleums)
were  restored  or  newly  built.  Ya’qûb  Beg’s  attitudes  bear  witness  to  the  Islamic
orthodoxy that his rule sought to impose on everyone. 
4 This strong Islamic orientation is also to be found in the Emirate’s foreign policy, as it is
described in Chapter 5. Admittedly, the treaties made with Britain and Russia, i. e., with
two out of the three major powers in the region, represent unprecedented diplomatic
openings  for  Eastern  Turkestan.  But  the  latter’s  perspectives  were  clearly  more
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focussed  on  the  Muslim  world  when  in  1865  Sayyid  Ya’qûb  Khân,  its  emissary  to
Istanbul,  capital  of  the Caliphate,  requested political  and military support from the
Ottoman Empire for the Emirate of Kashgar, all in the name of Islam. He was to return
again in 1873 to repeat this request to the Sultan ‘Abdülazîz, receiving satisfaction on
that  occasion.  In  addition to  Ya’qûb Beg’s  political  ability,  this  also  shows to  what
extent  Islam  in  the  frontier  regions  of  China  and  Turkestan  was  an  indispensable
source of legitimacy, recognition, and in the end, material aid. An appeal was made to
the idea of the unity of the Muslim world, representing a break in which China stood
for the infidel in opposition to the lands of Islam. Although this ideal did not prevent
the fall of the Kashgar Emirate and its reincorporation into the Qing empire after 1877
(Chapter 6), it is still important to grasp the historical significance of this moment of
Eastern Turkestan’s unity and independence.
5 From  a  politico-religious  point  of  view,  these  thirteen  years  are  neither  a  unique
moment nor a first occurrence. In fact there is a historical continuity. In a similar series
of events between 1680 and 1694 the Sufi holy man Khwâja Âfâq, with the support of
the Junggar Mongols, had overthrown Shaghatayid domination and set up a Sultanate
in Kashgar (dâr al-sultanat-i kâshgar) based on the principles of Islam and Sufism. The
fact that historians have become accustomed to seeing this as just an episode in the
final period of Junggar suzerainty does not alter the point that this was a period of
independence and unity fully recognised by the neighbouring states (the Khanate of
Bukhara,  the  Lamaist  theocracy  of  Tibet,  and  the  Qing  Empire)  as  well  as  their
Turkestani rivals. It was not by chance—indeed it was a highly meaningful move on his
part—that Ya’qûb Beg, on the day after receiving Ottoman recognition, organised an
investiture ceremony in the mausoleum of Khwâja Âfâq, a site of religious and political
commemoration. Nor is it surprising to encounter the continuing religious tradition
that led to Ya’qûb Beg being buried in the cemetery adjoining the mausoleum. 
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